Chapter 220 - Final Chapter 2 {2 Alone} (18 Alone, Progress of the Takamatsu Reforms)
Nishida was climbing the stairs to reach the small hill where the memorial monument stood; he didn't know if it was by the hands of locals, volunteers, or JR staff, but it had been considerably cleared of snow, and he was able to go up without difficulty.
Actually, Nishida had confirmed in advance with the staff at the Rubeshibe Police Box of the Kitami Station, through connections from his time working at the Kitami Regional HQ, whether the place where the memorial stood was buried in snow during the winter. He had received information that "snow removal is done relatively thoroughly." In other words, for Nishida, this was a naturally predictable situation, but it was also a fact that he had prepared "heavy equipment" just in case, and at the same time, that had brought good results in the snow removal at Okuda's grave visit.
When he reached the top of the hill, two young travelers—likely railway fans who had come for the abolition of Kanehana Station—were wandering around the memorial and taking photos of it. They seemed a bit startled to see Nishida arrive, but he surmised the reason was likely just the sudden appearance of an elderly man in an uninhabited environment, rather than mistaking him for a ghost.
Without minding the two, Nishida stood before the memorial—to be precise, the commemorative monument—took out a one-cup of sake he had prepared from his backpack, opened it, and splashed it quickly toward the base of the monument. There were already offerings left by someone else, so he could have offered it cup and all, but Nishida disliked it becoming trash and dared to offer only the contents. Then he quietly folded his hands and offered a silent prayer. Furthermore, during this silent prayer, Nishida recalled many of the events in the world over these 13 years, besides the Do-kei scandals.
Oshima Kaiji received a death sentence at the Kitami Branch of the Kushiro District Court in 2005, which became final without appeal, but he died of illness in 2007 at the Sapporo Detention Branch where he was held before it could be carried out. However, even if he hadn't died of illness in 2007, it was quite doubtful from Nishida's perspective whether a situation would have arisen where the Minister of Justice would have stamped the execution order for a former minister.
Tatsukawa, the Don of the Aoi-ikka, had been interrogated by the police for a long time on suspicion of all sorts of crimes, but because he completely denied them, he also died of illness before a verdict could be reached in court. In the end, Nishida and the others never obtained enough material to have a clear conviction as to whether the Shiun Association building bombing had been at Tatsukawa's instruction.
Although the evil deeds were not certified in court, it could be said that they brought him to justice in a broad sense by being able to arrest and interrogate him. However, in terms of the pursuit of truth, it was a result that left much to be desired.
Oshima's secretary, Nakagawa, also received a death sentence in 2004, which became final without appeal, and was executed in 2008 at Sapporo Prison. (Author's Note: In Sapporo and Sendai, executions are carried out in facilities within the prison adjacent to the detention center.) It is said he was calm at the end, but what did the man who aspired to be a politician think about having been caught up in the conspiracy of his mentor, Oshima, and leaving this world as a criminal at the end? If you call it irrational, it is so, but if he was a man aiming to be a politician, then like Oshima, if you say he should have returned to what was important, that's the end of the story.
Higashidate, the perpetrator of the Kitami Kyoritsu Hospital shooting, received a death sentence from the district court in 2005, and although he appealed, it was dismissed by the Sapporo High Court in 2007. Ultimately, he gave up on a final appeal and accepted the sentence. And in 2014, the death penalty was executed at Sapporo Prison.
Isaka Masamitsu was indicted in 2004 for crimes such as aiding and abetting murder, and a 10-year prison sentence became final without appeal. Nishida visited him at Chiba Prison, where he was held, when he went to Kanto for work, but he was released early in 2012 as a model prisoner and currently lives in Kitami with his family.
On the other hand, Sakamoto and Itagaki, who directly aided the construction company shooting and Higashidate and the others, fought up to the Sapporo High Court in 2006, and ultimately their final appeals were dismissed, and 12-year prison sentences were finalized for both. Currently, Sakamoto is imprisoned in Chiba Prison and Itagaki in Okayama Prison. (Author's Note: This setting is because for first-time offenders with a sentence of 10 years or more, there are only the choices of Chiba Prison or Okayama Prison.)
And the Boss, Aida Izumi, considering the written statement of Isaka Masamitsu, who was also a victim, his own remorse, the fact that nearly half of the money he extorted was donated to charities, petitions from neighbors and regular customers, and his age, received a three-year sentence in 2003 with five years of probation, and has now successfully completed the probation period. And today, after getting off at Engaru Station from the Special Rapid Kitami from Kanehana Station, Nishida was promised to have a meal served by the Boss at Yusen as a retirement celebration.
Meanwhile, the social climate since 2003 had shown dizzying movements.
On the international diplomatic front, triggered by the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government labeled the "war on terror" and clarified a hardline diplomatic stance. Ultimately, it named Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an "axis of evil" that possessed weapons of mass destruction and supported terrorism. And claiming that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and was planning terrorism, the U.S. and British forces launched military attacks from March 2003, and the regime of the dictator Hussein collapsed in an instant.
However, after that, within Iraq, conflict between the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam and inter-tribal conflicts increased sharply, and public order deteriorated much worse than in the Hussein era. Because of that, even Al-Qaeda, the genuine original terrorist organization, entered Iraq, leading to a vicious cycle of falling into a state of chaos.
Moreover, the weapons of mass destruction that were the reason for the attack ultimately did not exist, and it became a very bad ending where many Iraqi citizens were merely caught up in the indiscriminate terrorism frequently occurring after the end of combat by remnants of the Hussein regime and Islamic extremists. (Author's Note: Compared to the U.S. and Britain, which verified and criticized the political decisions leading to the start of the war at the time, Japan, which expressed support for it, has still left the political responsibility of that time unclear.) And now it has even given birth to a huge religious extremist group called the Islamic State (officially ISIL or ISIS), bringing about a deterioration of public order throughout the Middle East.
Japan also ended up dispatching the Self-Defense Forces into Iraq as part of expressing support for the U.S. government in order to have the U.S. government maintain external pressure on the North Korea issue. However, since they cannot be dispatched to conflict areas under the Constitution, Prime Minister Takamatsu dispatched them to the Samawah region, which he claimed was "not in a state of combat," for the purpose of providing resident support, but it is said that in reality, it was a situation equivalent to a war zone. (Author's Note: The reality was almost equivalent to a combat zone. http://www.nhk.or.jp/gendai/articles/3485/1.html)
As if to deal a finishing blow, the U.S. lost the leeway to deal with North Korea due to the quagmire after the end of the Iraq War and the lame-duck status of the Bush administration, and in the end, Japan met the misfortune of having the rug pulled out from under it by the U.S. side. (Author's Note: Removal of the designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. https://www.newsweekjapan.jp/stories/2009/05/post-143.php)
Looking domestically, the Takamatsu administration introduced various neoliberal policies while mixing in theater-style politics. These included the amendment of the Dispatch Law, the incorporation of universities as independent administrative agencies (after a cabinet decision in November 2002, the bill was submitted, passed, and enforced, transitioning from April 2004), which necessitated the independent procurement of research funds from private capital, and Takamatsu's long-cherished wish, postal privatization—pushing forward policies centered on "small government" or "privatization."
Particularly in postal privatization, after the postal privatization-related bills were rejected due to rebellion within the Minyu Party, he dissolved the House of Representatives to ask for the people's mandate (the postal dissolution in the summer of 2005). By clarifying his image as a "standard-bearer of reform," he not only gained overwhelming support from the people and drove the opposition Minsei Party into a crushing defeat, but also showed thoroughness by sending candidates recommended by the Minyu Party, called "assassins," to the home turf of the rebel members, successfully fulfilling his long-held desire.
However, 10 years have passed since then, and now, what has become of what through postal privatization, or more specifically, what has been improved, is a situation where almost no voters who supported it at the time can speak of it properly; this was a proof of a certain kind of folly, separate from the merits and demerits of postal privatization itself. It could be said that the people who were enthusiastic without even examining the contents, with only the image of "reform" preceding, were reproduced again in history, just like before the war. And the fact that there isn't even subsequent reflection or verification can be said to be even worse in a sense than the flow from during the war to after the war. (Author's Note: To be described later.)
The incorporation of universities as independent administrative agencies also, while successful in industry-academic cooperation, exposed the problem of "research that doesn't make money," especially basic research, being neglected. This reduction in university research costs had continued since before this, but including the Minsei Party administration after the subsequent change of government, it certainly led to a sudden narrowing of the base of Japanese research, and it is said to be continuing uninterrupted even now.
After that, Takamatsu succeeded in weakening the existing elderly leadership layer of the Minyu Party and building a rock-solid foundation. Then, he handed over the prime minister's seat to Tanabe, a young conservative who had a good image among the people as a hardliner on the North Korean abduction issue.
However, Tanabe was cornered by problems of past administrations that had nothing to do with his own administration, such as the unpaid pension problem, and also due to slips of the tongue coming from lack of experience and failures in cabinet appointments, he suffered a crushing defeat in the Upper House election. After that, showing weakness in his mental state and falling ill, he left the prime minister's seat in an instant after about a year. It was also an unusual development where he resigned immediately after his policy speech. The Minyu Party, which had enjoyed the spring of its life, was conversely cornered with two prime ministers changing in a short period, but the final trigger was to be pulled from overseas.
Author's Note: To be described later.
Regarding "postal privatization," the centerpiece of structural reform by Prime Minister Koizumi, although various purposes and effects were expected, almost no verification was done afterward, and after the enthusiasm, it was "forgotten" by the people; isn't the reality that most people don't really know what on earth happened? (Of course, there are those who do know.)
Here, just in case, I would like to briefly look back.
As a premise for talking about this problem, the system of depositing postal savings into "fiscal investment and loans" for special corporations that were being operated sloppily had already disappeared in 2001 with the "Act for Partial Amendment of the Act on Funds of the Trust Fund Bureau, etc.," and the most problematic point of the postal business (though the investment targets were limited to low-risk but low-interest government bonds, etc.) had actually already been resolved, as already touched upon in "Oshima Kaiji's Testament" in this work.
Also, regarding the postal business (mail, postal savings, simple insurance) previously conducted as a business under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, it first came under the jurisdiction of the Postal Services Agency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (born from the reorganization of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and the Ministry of Home Affairs) in 2001, and then was taken over by Japan Post as a special corporation in 2003. And after that, it took the form of privatization.
*Japan Post was "launched on April 1, 2003, based on the Japan Post Public Corporation Act, with full investment from the government. At the same time, in accordance with the provisions of the same enforcement act, it succeeded to the rights and obligations held by the state regarding the affairs of each postal business previously conducted by the Postal Services Agency (an external bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications), the successor to the postal-related departments of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, as well as the assets and liabilities of the Post Office Life Insurance Public Corporation.
The Postal Planning and Management Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, which supervises it, became the Postal Administration Bureau. At the same time, part of the inspection regarding postal savings and simple life insurance business was delegated to the Financial Services Agency by the Japan Post Public Corporation Act.
The officers and employees of the corporation were given the status of national public servants by law, with officers being special-service national public servants as defined in the National Public Service Act, and employees being general-service national public servants. (This is unusual; normally, officers and employees of a public corporation are not public servants.)"
(I'm sorry, but for the "" part, I have taken the liberty of extracting everything from Wikipedia because it's a hassle. Although it's Wikipedia, which is used in this work and cannot be said to be 100% in terms of credibility, the factual relationships are correct.)
https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC%E9%83%B5%E6%94%BF%E5%85%AC%E7%A4%BE
Furthermore, besides the fact that postal privatization was Prime Minister Koizumi's long-held desire, looking at articles (Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2005) saying that the U.S. side expected that a large amount of postal savings and simple insurance funds would flow into U.S. Treasury bonds and the U.S. stock market due to deregulation, and the fact that the U.S. government and Minister Takenaka had consulted many times with the Postal Privatization Preparation Office, it is seen as a clear fact that U.S. intentions were strongly involved in postal privatization.
https://www.m-kiuchi.com/2009/02/09/kaikakuriken/
First, based on these, let's look at the purpose of postal privatization and the system at the starting point.
● Purpose of privatization and organizational structure at the start
1) There is a high possibility that the postal business will become unsustainable due to the spread of e-mail, etc.
2) Since diversity has emerged in financial services, it is necessary to make postal savings capable of responding to that.
3) It is necessary to respond to the internationalization of logistics.
4) By dividing the business of the Japan Post Public Corporation into four companies (counter services, mail, postal savings, simple insurance), diverse services will come to be provided cheaply, and the responsibilities and management efforts of each business will become clear.
Along with this, the counter service business is entrusted to "Japan Post Network Co., Ltd.," mail and parcels to "Japan Post Service Co., Ltd.," postal savings to "Japan Post Bank," and simple insurance to "Japan Post Insurance."
Furthermore, Japan Post Holdings is established as a holding company (in reality, the successor to the main body of the Japan Post Public Corporation) that holds all the shares of each company, letting it handle the management of the entire business, and ultimately achieving complete privatization through the listing of the shares of each company under its control. At the same time, the Japan Post Holdings main body is also to be privatized by listing its shares (while disposing of the shares of each business company). Also, it is collectively called the Japan Post Group, including the companies under its control.
5) Since the Japan Post Public Corporation is a "special corporation," it is exempt from corporate tax, corporate inhabitant tax, and business tax, so by making it a private enterprise, the burden is clarified, and an increase in national treasury revenue is sought.
6) By changing the management of the huge amount of postal savings (accurately "savings" after privatization) and simple insurance (kanpo) funds (totaling over 300 trillion at the time of postal privatization) from limited investment in safe assets such as government bonds to investment in the stock market, etc., market revitalization becomes possible.
7) Reduction of national public servants who are employees of the Japan Post Public Corporation becomes possible.
8) Reduction of the vested interests of specific post offices (the problem of "watashikiri-hi" (T/N: lump-sum payments for expenses) and the fact that many are practically individually managed stores, and despite being national public servants, unlike normal examination-based hiring, appointments are nepotistic, etc.).
These were the purposes of privatization and the form of the initial organizational change accompanying postal privatization (see the sources below).
A) http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2013pdf/20131101069.pdf
Now, let's briefly look at what happened to each item.
1) Regarding postcards, etc., it is a clear fact that the prediction was correct.
https://mainichi.jp/articles/20161223/k00/00m/020/068000c
https://www.yuseimineika.go.jp/iinkai/dai158/siryou158_1_2.pdf (Note page 20)
Regarding New Year's cards, which are the main earner:
http://www.garbagenews.net/archives/2114695.html
It is a downward trend.
However, with the spread of "online shopping" (naturally this means the decline of local shops and each large physical store), parcel-type items like Yu-Pack have increased profits in the last few years, so it can be said to be an unexpected event at the "time of privatization."
https://www.tsuhannews.jp/52016
http://cargo-news.co.jp/cargo-news-main/978
What will happen to this in the future? Since the labor shortage in the transport industry is accelerating due to the excessive increase in parcels from online shopping, there are doubts about the possibility that profits will continue to grow, but in terms of unit price, it is higher than general mail and cannot be replaced by internet communication, so there is no doubt that it has the potential to become the mainstay of the postal business. In any case, it is a phenomenon unrelated to the merits and demerits of "privatization."
2) Regarding this, views will differ depending on whether one positions Japan Post Bank as an organization equivalent to existing banks or as a complementary financial institution. In a sense, it could become "private business suppression by existing privatization," so it is also possible to perceive it as putting the cart before the horse. (However, unlike general banks, Japan Post Bank cannot perform lending operations.)
Moreover, despite previously having a deposit limit of 10 million yen, in 2016 it was 13 million yen (https://www.jp-bank.japanpost.jp/news/2016/news_id001147.html).
Furthermore, increasing it to 16 million yen is even being considered (https://news.yahoo.co.jp/pickup/6305279), so it can be said that criticism is even more likely to apply.
As for the reason for this increase, it is not clear whether it simply intends to expand the management of Japan Post Bank, or whether there are "scoundrels" behind it trying to make money through price increases by making funds flow into the stock and bond markets through "reinforcement of the investment amount," but regardless of the surface or hidden purposes, there is no doubt that it will become a pressure on deposit acquisition against conventional banks, so it could be said to be something that denies the very essence of the significance of privatization.
3) They are developing services like the following:
https://www.post.japanpost.jp/int/globallogistics/
However, as for whether this could not have been done without privatization, judgment will be divided.
Personally, since the EMS service (https://www.post.japanpost.jp/int/ems/) existed since the era before the Japan Post Public Corporation, I do not consider it a particularly great achievement of privatization, but since I do not know to what extent there was "flexibility in business alliances, etc." during the Japan Post Public Corporation era, I will avoid making a definitive statement.
4) The spin-off of the counter business and the postal business caused various confusions from the beginning, and in the end, the two were integrated, and by the Act for Partial Amendment of the Postal Privatization Act, etc., in October 2012, it became Japan Post Co., Ltd. (the reality is that Japan Post Network Co., Ltd. absorbed and merged Japan Post Service Co., Ltd.).
https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/youseikaikaku/dai8/shiryou1.pdf (Item 2)
In the first place, the reality is that Japan Post Holdings, the holding company of the group and successor to the Japan Post Public Corporation, currently relies on Japan Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance for most of its revenue. That structure has not changed at all from before privatization.
https://vdata.nikkei.com/prj2/jppreport/
5) There are materials on page 8 and after of the summary of the House of Councillors in A, so I will mention it based on that and
B) http://report.jbaudit.go.jp/org/h27/ZUIJI6/2015-h27-Z6012-0.htm
the investigation by the Board of Audit.
In the seven and a half years up to the time of the creation of this B material (October 2007 to March 2015), the Japan Post Group has paid over 2.089 trillion yen in corporate taxes, etc. (There is a difference in the tax payment amount when looking at the consolidated profit and loss statement of the Japan Post Group and the same fiscal year by year, but it is probably the time lag between the amount actually paid into the national treasury during that fiscal year and the calculated corporate tax amount for that fiscal year on the profit and loss statement.)
Besides that, consumption tax is 281.2 billion yen in tax payments in the five and a half years (only five and a half years in A because there is no consumption tax in the B material). It is seen that an annual payment amount of slightly less than 50 billion yen is continuing. Also, dividends to the state from the Japan Post Group have reached 230.4 billion yen in seven and a half years.
Looking only at corporate taxes, etc., the annual average is about 278 billion yen, so the overall contribution to the national treasury including dividends, etc., would be roughly 350 billion yen per year (since I don't know the amounts for all fiscal years, this is just an estimate).
On the other hand, although the Japan Post Public Corporation era did not pay taxes, it paid 962.5 billion yen in a lump sum before privatization "according to the provisions of Article 37 of the Japan Post Public Corporation Act, which stipulated the payment of reserves to the national treasury." Since the Japan Post Public Corporation existed for four and a half years, this would average out to about 237.6 billion per year.
As described above, looking limitedly at the amount of contribution to the national treasury, it has clearly increased by more than 100 billion on average per year through privatization during the period seen in the data, and regarding this, it can be clearly concluded that privatization is a "success."
However, regarding the paid consumption tax, by a resolution of the Diet in 2018, it was decided to transfer about 20 billion yen per year to Japan Post Co., Ltd. to ensure the survival of post offices,
(https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO31260240R00C18A6EA3000/
https://www.sankei.com/economy/news/180401/ecn1804010004-n1.html)
and it is certain that it will decrease by about 20 billion per year for legal reasons from now on. Well, after all, while saying it's complete privatization, they had publicly stated the maintenance of universal (nationwide uniform) service for post offices, so it was self-evident that they had to do this (or rather, personally, it's something that "naturally should be done"), and while this point is unavoidable, it is a negative point for the significance of privatization.
Also, regarding taxes for fiscal years outside the above data, regarding corporate taxes, etc., in the Japan Post Group (consolidated) settlement for the 2016 (Heisei 28) fiscal year (April 2016 to March 2017),
(http://contents.xj-storage.jp/xcontents/AS06651/6391379d/6520/4a36/8823/f16c5535f1cc/140120170512471367.pdf (Page 10))
it has dropped considerably to about 155 billion yen, but for the 2015 (Heisei 27) fiscal year,
(http://contents.xj-storage.jp/xcontents/AS06651/6979e988/373c/43df/ada5/de36e0faa257/140120160512486909.pdf (Page 12))
it was about 236.6 billion yen, so it is due to the processing of a loss of about 400 billion yen from the merger of an Australian transport company.
https://www.mag2.com/p/money/218326
Note that similar losses occurred in JP Express, which was born from the integration with Nippon Express's Pelican Bin after postal privatization (about 100 billion).
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS2502S_V20C10A6EE2000/
This "occurrence of huge losses" is also a "failure" because of privatization, but there is naturally a "possibility" of success, and rather than saying it failed because it was privatized, it should be said to be a management judgment error (specifically, President Nishimuro). Naturally, the conclusion is that "management will go well because it was privatized" was "nonsense."
Furthermore, among the Japan Post Group (Japan Post Holdings and the controlled Japan Post Co., Ltd., Japan Post Bank, and Japan Post Insurance), three companies excluding Japan Post Co., Ltd. were listed on the stock market in 2015, and privatization in the complete sense was achieved. (At the time of this listing, the shares of Japan Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance held by Japan Post Holdings were also released.)
From the start of stock listing in two rounds, it is seen that the state had about 2.8 trillion yen in revenue from the sale of Japan Post shares. (A considerable amount was allocated to the reconstruction funds for the Great East Japan Earthquake.) Since it was 2.8 trillion yen for about 40% including the buyback of its own shares from the government by Japan Post, I thought there was a high possibility that it would ultimately be a total national treasury income of slightly less than 5 trillion yen considering that it is legally stipulated that up to two-thirds can be sold, but with the subsequent sluggish stock price, the outlook seems to be becoming somewhat uncertain.
https://vdata.nikkei.com/prj2/jppreport/
From the above points as well, the degree of contribution to the national treasury including taxes and dividends clearly became higher through postal privatization.
On the other hand, if you consider that during the Japan Post Public Corporation era, the "retained earnings," which were part of the capital of the Japan Post Public Corporation, were substantially the state's share, then that completely fell away with privatization, and it can also be taken that 5 trillion yen's worth was "lost" from the national treasury.
https://www.yuseimineika.go.jp/iinkai/dai38/siryou4.pdf (Refer to the balance sheet on page 12)
Depending on how you perceive this, your view may change considerably.
6) Among the investment assets, regarding government bonds and local government bonds, Japan Post Bank holds about 107 trillion yen and Japan Post Insurance holds about 57 trillion yen (https://www.japanpost.jp/ir/library/earnings/past/pdf/03_2016_q1_01.pdf (Page 7 and after)), so even now, more than half of the investment assets are in public bond investment.
However, among the assets held by Japan Post Bank, it holds over 37 trillion yen in foreign securities called "other securities" (annotation in the margin of the source), and this can be seen as a symbolic example of the change in the composition of held assets (so-called portfolio) due to privatization.
For the portfolio including the Japan Post Public Corporation era, please refer to:
http://report.jbaudit.go.jp/org/h27/ZUIJI6/2015-h27-Z6113-0.htm
Looking at it this way, it seems that the aspect of privatization "for foreign countries" was also strong.
7) Regarding this, although the employees had national public servant treatment, the Japan Post Public Corporation had already adopted an "independent accounting system," so even if its employees changed from national public servants to complete private workers, if you consider that there was originally no government personnel cost burden, it would only have the meaning of them no longer being public servants whose employment protection was clear. From a financial perspective, there is no benefit from privatization at all.
8) Specific post offices, which are the post offices in town, came to be managed by Japan Post Network Co., Ltd. (later Japan Post Co., Ltd.) after privatization. By that, it became possible to reduce the vested interests of specific postmasters such as "watashikiri-hi," but there seem to be many parts that haven't changed much, such as the substantial hereditary succession of specific postmasters.
Regarding the current management status and problems of the Japan Post Group, there are:
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO30536510V10C18A5EE8000/
https://biz-journal.jp/2017/08/post_20066.html
https://matome.naver.jp/odai/2148843818262099601 (Please consider in advance that it is a so-called "summary site" and there is some bias)
http://news.livedoor.com/article/detail/15493470/
etc.
Looking comprehensively, although there was a contribution to the national treasury through privatization at present, if you think of the real-time enthusiasm where postal privatization was made into a major theme as if it were the savior of Japan, it is also a fact that it only had an effect at the level of being a letdown. And above all, it is also a fact that the doubts that existed before privatization as to where on earth the purpose of postal privatization lay have not been resolved.