Chapter 221 - Final Chapter 3 {3 Alone} (19 Alone, The Sudden Raid of the Lehman Shock and the Tragedy of the Great East Japan Earthquake)
In Japan before that, from a relatively early stage after the Takamatsu administration was inaugurated, it maintained a very long period of good economic conditions called the "Izanami Boom." (However, since the growth rate was low, there was a debate as to whether to call this a boom. http://kezai.net/jpn/izanami)
As for the factors, first of all, it can be mentioned that the export industry was pulled by the good overseas demand (external demand) centered on the U.S. due to the rise of new industries such as IT. Furthermore, because interest rates were set lower than in other countries for the purpose of economic stimulation (the so-called "zero interest rate policy" by the Nichigin), the method of making money by borrowing yen in Japan, converting the borrowed yen into foreign currency, and investing and managing it overseas where interest rates were high (the so-called yen carry trade) became active; the yen sold as a result led to a weak yen in the exchange market, and through that currency depreciation, a structure was even created where exports became more advantageous in terms of price competition and exchange gains.
On the other hand, from 2001 to 2006, quantitative monetary easing was carried out by the Nichigin buying Japanese government bonds in the market (so-called buying operations) to increase the money supply in the market, but it is said that the effect was quite thin because the scale was not that large and there was not much demand for funds at the time. (Author's Note: It is also said to be because of the so-called "liquidity trap," where quantitative easing has no effect when policy interest rates are extremely low for monetary easing purposes, but there is also a counterargument that it is effective if large-scale easing is carried out over a long period, and in fact, it succeeded in Japan and the U.S. afterward.)
However, as it was called a "recovery without a real sense of it," the reality was that the average growth rate was below 2%. Also, although employment became more active than during the Ice Age, it was hardly reflected in wages, etc., due to the increase in dispatched workers, and the performance of small and medium-sized enterprises, including subcontractors, could not be said to be a boom except for those involved in external demand. In the end, it remained a strong performance centered on (export-oriented) large corporations, and it is also evaluated that there was not much ripple effect on internal demand despite that long-term boom.
Even if sacrificing the wages and treatment of workers to improve corporate performance under a great depression was unavoidable as a "necessity" in a sense, the reality was likely that even during the subsequent recovery and the apparent boom, there was no reward for the workers who "endured the pain."
And a sudden abnormality began to occur even in these long-term external favorable factors. From around the end of 2007, subprime loans for housing, which had depended on the U.S. version of the real estate bubble, became non-performing loans along with the fall in real estate prices, and problems began to occur in the management of overseas financial institutions.
The subprime crisis was thought to have subsided for a while from the latter half of 2007 to the beginning of 2008, but with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a major international securities company that had incorporated a large amount of subprime loans into financial products, in the summer of 2008, the damage expanded to the world rather than reigniting. The so-called "Lehman Shock" thrust the world economy into the depths. Stock prices also crashed globally in a short period.
Actually, at this time, the financial sector (department) such as Japanese banks had not dabbled much in dangerous products due to the "experience" of the bubble collapse, and looking globally, they were in the healthiest state. The Japanese government also had that recognition, and it can be said that it was not wrong at all.
However, in contrast to the long time lag of several years Japan had after the bubble collapse that began in earnest around '90 until it faced the full-scale financial depression of '97, for some reason, immediately after the Lehman Shock (October–December 2008 quarter), it faced an abnormal situation where the GDP fell the most among advanced countries, even more than the U.S., the epicenter (real GDP 10.3% at an annual rate, 3.2% decrease from the previous quarter, seasonally adjusted).
This situation worsened further in the following January–March 2009 quarter (13.7% at an annual rate, 4.2% decrease from the previous quarter), becoming the worst since the war. (Author's Note: Since unified data such as preliminary and final figures cannot be found on the internet, the values are suspicious as clear values, but please understand that the trend is undoubtedly correct. I "intend" to present the final figures. Even so, it was troublesome because the final figures did not match even between sites of public organizations. It is said that there is no country like Japan that corrects the GDP so many times until it is finalized.)
As for the reason for this, first of all, because the financial sector was healthy, global assets and funds "escaped" or "returned" to Japan, leading to a sharper appreciation of the yen than the economic situation warranted. Also, the U.S. implemented a weak dollar policy for the purpose of making its own industries advantageous. Furthermore, due to the progress of that yen appreciation and the decrease in interest rate differences, a "backflow phenomenon" occurred due to the resolution of yen carry trades (in other words, changing the repayment amount from foreign currency to yen to pay back debts), which (this could also be called a return) ended up spurring the yen's appreciation. The rapid appreciation of the yen brought about a marked deterioration in the revenue from external demand, which had already plummeted, in terms of exchange rates.
And above all, it can be mentioned that after the financial depression due to the bubble collapse, the Japanese economy had neglected the redistribution of income to workers for a long time and had completely transitioned to a system of wage suppression (the expansion of dispatched labor and the appearance of the Ice Age where employment itself shrank). This is also reflected in the fact that the flow from Japan's bubble collapse to the full-scale financial depression several years later and the flow of the great depression immediately after the Lehman Shock went through contrasting processes.
The former was a structure (which was also a factor that allowed the postponement of non-performing loan disposal and conversely deepened the wound) of a thick internal demand built up through the high-rate redistribution of profits obtained from external demand to workers, which for a while supplemented (ended up supplementing) the huge non-performing loans and financial instability due to the management failure of the financial sector.
In contrast, the latter was a structure of a combination of a paper-thin internal demand that had completely ceased to function as a cushion against external depression, in addition to the transition to an economic structure extremely susceptible to external demand and the slump in essential external demand, despite the financial sector being extremely healthy.
Moreover, while Japan's bubble occurred along with active domestic investment due to the temporary depression caused by the initial yen appreciation from the Plaza Accord and the subsequent low interest rates accompanying economic stimulation measures, the Lehman Shock was conversely a case where the yen appreciation created by the return of risk money simply continued to erode the domestic economy. The fact that interest rates, although the zero interest rate policy had been lifted, were in a state incomparably lower than at the time of the bubble (the official discount rate was 2.5% during the bubble, but 0.5% before the Lehman Shock) also led to the fact that there were almost no moves that could be made in terms of policy interest rates.
Also, the fact that workers who had increased not as regular employees but as unstable non-regular employees such as dispatched labor during the period of good external demand had their contracts terminated all at once due to the collapse of external demand (the so-called haken-giri (T/N: termination of dispatched workers)) can be said to be a symbolic event of this series of flows. And that anxiety further shrank internal demand. (Author's Note: To be described later 1)
Due to the economic slump after the Lehman Shock and excessive criticism by the media, the Masaoka Cabinet of the Minyu Party was driven to dissolve the House of Representatives in July 2009, and the government changed in the election at the end of August. In September, the Tsuruyama coalition cabinet led by the Minsei Party was born.
However, including dream stories such as "buried gold" in the public pledges backfired by inflating the voters' expectations too much. Due to subsequent management mistakes of the administration such as the relocation issue of the U.S. military base in Okinawa and Tsuruyama's own tax evasion scandal, it had to change to the next Sugano Cabinet in less than a year.
Bad things continue. Immediately after the change of prime minister, Sugano, perhaps feeling good about the recovery of the Minsei Party administration's approval rating, brought up the "consumption tax increase theory" led by the Ministry of Finance, and as a result, he was defeated in the subsequent Upper House election (the defeat is seen to have been fundamentally due to distrust toward the vacillation of the Tsuruyama Cabinet), causing a twisted Diet phenomenon where the majorities in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors were different. By this, he became a so-called lame duck (dead body), and furthermore, he lost the support of the people due to a mistake in dealing with the intrusion of a Chinese fishing boat off the Senkaku Islands. (Author's Note: To be described later 2)
And the fateful March 11, 2011, arrives. On this day, Sugano had been pursued in the Diet's questioning since morning over an illegal foreign donation scandal from a Zainichi Korean reported in the newspapers, but shortly before 3:00 PM, a large-scale earthquake of magnitude 9.0, one of the largest in world history, occurred off the coast of Miyagi Prefecture. (Author's Note: To be precise, the total of three continuous earthquakes that occurred along with the first earthquake. http://www.asahi.com/special/10005/TKY201103130302.html) Not to mention Sanriku, which had suffered from many tsunami damages in history, a great tsunami struck the entire Pacific coast of eastern Japan, becoming a great disaster that produced nearly 20,000 dead and missing people.
Furthermore, due to the earthquake, the external power of the Kanto Electric Power Futaba Power Plant in Fukushima Prefecture was lost, and on top of that, a great tsunami rushed in, stopping the diesel generators that were generating power as emergency power sources; by the cooling function being completely lost, a level 7 meltdown since the Chernobyl nuclear accident occurred immediately after that.
The collapse of the "historical" real estate and land myth, which had already been experienced once before the war, appeared before the eyes of the current generation again as a real-time "experience" during the bubble collapse in the 90s. However, the current management of Shizuoka Bank, to whom that experience had been directly passed down from those who experienced it at the time, was able to take appropriate action without being misled, thanks to the hearsay information that had become their own flesh and blood.
Also, it is said that almost all elementary and junior high school students in Kamaishi City were able to survive amidst the great tsunami damage because the experience of past tsunami damage had been actively incorporated into children's education. (Author's Note: The so-called "Kamaishi Miracle." https://www.sankei.com/life/news/140310/lif1403100041-n1.html)
On the other hand, the collapse of the nuclear safety myth in Japan struck the current generation as a first in "Japan's" history and at the same time as a first real-time experience. However, depending on how one evaluates the Kanto Electric Power Kariba Power Plant accident during the 2004 Chuetsu Earthquake, it might be possible to see that they had already experienced "collapse." Furthermore, it was precisely because of that experience that the "seismic isolation important building," which could respond to nuclear plant operations even during a large earthquake, was constructed at the Futaba Power Plant, and since it actually demonstrated a great effect in responding to the nuclear accident, it can be said that it was at least partially utilized.
(Author's Note: Regarding the Kariwa Power Plant accident, which is the model for the Kariba Power Plant in the work, http://www.shippai.org/fkd/cf/CZ0200804.html)
In the double crisis of great damage by tsunami and a nuclear accident, the political economy was in extreme confusion throughout March in a crisis of national survival since the end of the lost war in August 1945, when two atomic bombs were dropped in a short period and the Soviet Union invaded after breaking the non-aggression treaty, but it barely held the line thanks to some good luck. (If there hadn't been a miracle in the fuel pool of Unit 4, there was even a danger that people would no longer be able to live in the Kanto region in some cases. http://judiciary.asahi.com/articles/2012030800001.html)
However, criticized for the earthquake response centered on the nuclear accident, the Sugano Cabinet would step down after the summer. (Author's Note: To be described later 3)
The Noguchi Cabinet that followed was also tossed about by "internal troubles and external threats": the Japanese economy unable to recover from the Lehman Shock, sluggish external demand, and the aftereffects of the Great East Japan Earthquake.
In particular, it was painful that the exchange market, which had originally been on a yen appreciation trend since the Lehman Shock, continued in a situation of going back and forth around 80 yen to the dollar despite the Nichigin's exchange intervention, due to the "yen appreciation phenomenon after a great disaster" also experienced in the Hanshin Earthquake. By this, it suffered economic damage in the form of a different bad influence from the direct earthquake damage. (Author's Note: To be described later 4)
Furthermore, even within the twisted structure of the Diet, the management of the Noguchi Cabinet became extremely difficult. And as a gamble, it launched into a general election for the House of Representatives in November 2012 on the premise of a consumption tax increase, but suffered a crushing defeat, and the Minsei Party cabinet would come to an end at the end of 2012.
Nishida was in the office as the Section 1 Assistant Manager of the Hakodate Regional HQ at the time of 3/11, but immediately after turning on the TV and seeing it following the occurrence of the earthquake, he was convinced from the size of the earthquake that "a tsunami will come to Sanriku" without waiting for a warning. However, he could not predict the disaster where a great tsunami exceeding that conviction covered not just Sanriku but the entire eastern Japan area. (Author's Note: Even around Ago Bay, a rias coast in Mie Prefecture far away, it became a tsunami of several meters, and damage occurred to aquaculture rafts, etc. https://iseshima.keizai.biz/headline/1096/)
The way the great tsunami easily climbed over the high seawalls, the guardian deities against tsunamis in each municipality of the Sanriku region, and washed away not just people and cars but entire towns, was exactly like water overflowing from a bathtub, and it vividly showed the wonders of nature. it made one feel a power incomparable to the tsunami images from the Sumatra-Andaman Earthquake that occurred in 2004.
Nishida later learned that the world's best seawall in Taro, which he and Yoshimura had visited and climbed in '02, was greatly destroyed, although its momentum was weakened before the giant tsunami. And many police officers (comrades) serving on the Pacific coast of Tohoku were swallowed by the tsunami and died in the line of duty while performing tasks such as evacuation guidance and traffic control during signal power outages.
Even within the prefecture, the Pacific coast such as Kushiro was struck by a tsunami of several meters, and in Hakodate, a tragedy was also seen where a person with physical disabilities could not escape from the first floor of an apartment and drowned (the only victim within the prefecture).
However, along with the mourning for the many people who died due to the tsunami, for the even more survivors whose subsequent lives must have been greatly upended by the tsunami, Nishida could not help but overlap the lives of the two cousins, Kuwano Kinya and Oshima Kaiji, also known as Onodera Michitoshi.
And in the nuclear accident that occurred immediately after, because it was exactly the accident at the Futaba Power Plant that became the direct trigger for Takagaki Shinichi to leave the Tozai Shinbun, he felt the irony of fate in the close connection between the series of cases he experienced and the two major events that occurred on 3/11.
Even so, that the maintenance and management of a power plant that should be producing electricity required electricity from the outside (and the power supply source was not Kanto Electric Power but Michinoku Electric Power, which has jurisdiction over the Tohoku region) was something he had absolutely no prior knowledge of as a problem before the nuclear safety myth, and Nishida was ashamed of himself for judging the right and wrong of things with this level of knowledge.
Author's Note: To be described later 1
Looking at the real economic growth rate, despite the fact that the rate of decrease had never exceeded minus 1% by fiscal year (that is, from April to the following March) even after the infamous bubble collapse, after the Lehman Shock, a rate of decrease exceeding 2% was recorded for two consecutive years, showing how abnormal the recession was. http://honkawa2.sakura.ne.jp/4400.html
Incidentally, as I will touch upon in Author's Note: To be described later 4, the exchange rate has swung sharply toward yen appreciation since after the Hanshin Earthquake, and although there was a period of going back and forth in the low 80-yen range just like the Great East Japan Earthquake, you should be able to see that 1995 (94 yen on an annual average) had a sufficiently high growth rate. http://ecodb.net/exchange/usd_jpy.html (Note the "annual" transition of the dollar-yen exchange rate)
Looking at this, it can be seen that if external demand is constant and the internal demand structure is solid, there is no need to make the exchange rate more yen-depreciated than necessary. Of course, it is also a fact that it can be said precisely because it was an era when "the competitiveness of Japanese export companies" was more than price competition. Conversely, today's external demand industries might include a decline in international competitiveness, where they cannot do anything without the help of the exchange rate.
In any case, in terms of the impact the bubble collapse had on the Japanese economy, rather than the impact on the economy itself, an analysis that it prompted a shift in awareness regarding corporate views on employment, labor systems, and furthermore, the social distribution of profits might be more accurate. It is obvious even looking at the graph that appears in the image on the following site. With this, it's natural to have "deflation." Even during the period called the Izanami Boom, the nominal value, which is the face value, was on a downward trend. For the time being, during this period, large corporations should have been making more money than during the bubble... http://saigaijyouhou.com/blog-entry-19489.html
Also, regarding the total unemployment rate, after the full-scale financial depression following the bubble collapse in '97, it produced the so-called Ice Age generation, peaked at 5.5% in January 2003 (5.4% on an annual basis), and turned to a decrease during the Izanami Boom. However, it rose again due to the Lehman Shock, hitting the worst post-war value of 5.6% in July 2009, and on an annual basis, it was 5.1% for both 2009 and 2010. http://honkawa2.sakura.ne.jp/3080.html
Author's Note: To be described later 2
The captain of the Chinese fishing boat, who was arrested and detained for crashing into and damaging a Coast Guard vessel, was later released by what was ostensibly the judgment of the prosecution but in reality a political judgment. However, immediately after the captain's arrest, employees of the general contractor "Fujita," who were visiting China at the request of the Chinese government, were (unjustly) arrested on suspicion of spying, and Chinese retaliation such as an embargo on rare earths (as a result, it led to a move away from Chinese rare earths, and the Chinese side lost great profits from a long-term perspective) was in the background of that judgment. It is thought that the detention of the Fujita employees was particularly significant.
On the Chinese side, it can be seen as one of the moves to shake the Japanese side by utilizing the trouble that originated from the U.S. military base issue between the Democratic Party administration and the U.S. side. This point is exactly the same as the method of the Chinese government after the female president of Huawei was caught in Canada at the request of the U.S. in December 2018. It's a so-called "hostage exchange." Of course, the U.S. is also doing aggressive diplomatic policies, but China normally goes beyond that.
Note that although the video taken at the time of the Coast Guard collision later leaked through a Coast Guard official and caused a great stir, it had already been shown to (some) Diet members, and calling the leak of classified information by a whistleblower a bit of an overstatement. In fact, even within the Coast Guard, information management was not done and it was in a state where anyone could see it.
Incidentally, even under the Koizumi administration, after Chinese activists landed on the Senkaku Islands, they were deported immediately after being arrested by the Okinawa Prefectural Police without being detained (because there was no direct damage), but in the end, the reality was that the Japanese side was always making concessions in this kind of story.
Regarding the judgment of Prime Minister Koizumi at the time, there are two possible evaluations: that this political judgment prevented an overreaction by the Chinese side, and that it was less than "weak-kneed" under the Democratic Party administration. In any case, under the Kan Cabinet, since there was damage to the Coast Guard vessel, the judgment of "not detaining after arrest" was likely impossible in reality. https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%B0%96%E9%96%A3%E8%AB%B8%E5%B3%B6%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E6%BC%81%E8%88%B9%E8%A1%9D%E7%AA%81%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6 https://www.news-postseven.com/archives/20120914_142610.html
Author's Note: To be described later 3
Generally, in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, it is said that "the nuclear plant withstood the earthquake but was hit by an unexpected tsunami," but in reality, it would be accurate to call it an inaccurate expression.
This is because the seismic intensity near Fuku-ichi at the time (Futaba Town, Naraha Town) was a strong 6, and along with the occurrence of the earthquake, scram (inserting control rods into the core inside the reactor to suppress the nuclear fission reaction and emergency stop; however, this does not mean that heat stops being generated) was successful, but part of the piping of the cooling system and the power receiving and supply facilities for external power were damaged by the earthquake itself. If those had been safe even in the earthquake (especially the external power), even if a tsunami struck, there is a high possibility that it could have been cooled without much problem.
"The nuclear plant withstood the earthquake" is correct as "The reactor withstood the earthquake," and as for the entire system of the nuclear plant, I think it can be asserted that it should originally be expressed as having been considerably hit by the earthquake itself. https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%A6%8F%E5%B3%B6%E7%AC%AC%E4%B8%80%E5%8E%9F%E5%AD%90%E5%8A%9B%E7%99%BA%E9%9B%BB%E6%89%80%E4%BA%8B%E6%95%85 http://www.asahi.com/special/10005/TKY201105240733.html
Also, regarding the excuse that "the tsunami was unexpected," there is the fact that Director Yoshida himself (he was not the director at the time) was in the TEPCO central meeting that did not adopt the opinion of scholars that the tsunami would exceed 10m, and although he fought a lonely battle after the accident, while the words are bad, there is also an aspect of a certain kind of self-inflicted retribution. And rather than the "possibility" in terms of science, it is necessary to recognize the weight of having ignored the "fact" that a great tsunami due to a large earthquake (Jogan Earthquake) in this vicinity had already struck eastern Japan in "history"—in other words, a historical fact that was also based on scientific verification existed. http://www.scj.go.jp/ja/event/pdf2/170801-1.pdf https://unit.aist.go.jp/ievg/report/jishin/tohoku/06_08_03.pdf http://www.shippai.org/images/html/news848/article1.pdf https://www.kahoku.co.jp/special/spe1090/20180830_02.html https://gendai.ismedia.jp/articles/-/44293?page=3
Furthermore, the Fuku-ichi site itself failed in the initial response (specifically, misidentifying that the emergency condenser was operating and making a mistake in response, which accelerated the subsequent meltdown) due to the confusion caused by the earthquake and tsunami. http://genpatsu.tokyo-np.co.jp/page/detail/11
Regarding venting, at the point they lost power, they didn't even know the manual method at first, and finally they somehow found a way to vent from the outside even in high radiation doses, but a considerable amount of time was spent until then. Note that, as will be mentioned later, during this time the then-Prime Minister Kan visited Fuku-ichi and it became a "problem" that he interfered with the site work, but while Director Yoshida himself testified in the Yoshida Testimony that "it was an unnecessary visit," he also testified that "if we could vent, we would have done it even if the Prime Minister came," and that there was no causal relationship at all between Prime Minister Kan's visit and the delay in venting. https://www.sankei.com/affairs/news/140822/afr1408220003-n2.html (See also the next page 3 of this site)
In the first place, because of the pressure inside the reactor, despite the desperate water injection work, subsequent verification results have come out showing that almost no water had entered, and it should be seen that at the point the initial response failed, it was already "checkmate."
● Accident process of Unit 1
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/outline/2_3-j.html
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/outline/2_4-j.html
● Accident process of Unit 2
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/outline/2_5-j.html
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/outline/2_6-j.html
● Accident process of Unit 3
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/outline/2_7-j.html
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/outline/2_8-j.html
● Accident process of Unit 4
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/outline/2_9-j.html
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/outline/2_10-j.html
● Overall flow
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/outline/2_11-j.html
● Reason why Fukushima Daini NPS avoided a severe accident unlike Fukushima Daiichi NPS
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/outline/2_12-j.html
● Latest verification (NHK Special)
https://www.nhk.or.jp/special/plus/articles/20170418/index.html
● Did the much-criticized helicopter water drop have any meaning?
https://president.jp/articles/-/23927?page=2
https://www.sankei.com/affairs/news/140825/afr1408250005-n2.html
https://tvtopic.goo.ne.jp/program/ex/641/645243/
Note that looking at the outcome of the final helicopter water drop, it can be seen that the U.S. government, the Prime Minister's Official Residence, and the site each had their own views. Probably "as an effect it had almost no meaning" is the fact, but was it a case of "having to do anything"?
The U.S. government seems to have thought that "Prime Minister Kan and the government had no sense of ownership at first," but the Japanese side's evaluation is that "Prime Minister Kan interfered too much without leaving it to TEPCO from the beginning," and it is surprising how different it is depending on the viewpoint. Just to be sure, according to the "Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness," the Prime Minister has a legal need to give instructions to those concerned, at least tentatively.
Also, the Official Residence side is seen as not having been active in requesting cooperation from the U.S. at first, but it can be seen that the situation forced them to listen to what the U.S. said.
http://www.alter-magazine.jp/index.php?%EF%BD%9E%E7%A6%8F%E5%B3%B6%E7%AC%AC%EF%BC%91%E5%8E%9F%E7%99%BA%E4%BA%8B%E6%95%85%E3%81%AB%E3%81%8A%E3%81%91%E3%82%8B%E6%97%A5%E7%B1%B3%E9%96%A2%E4%BF%82%EF%BD%9E
(The above source refers to "Countdown Meltdown" (written by Funabashi Yoichi), and since I have read the book before, I think the content is almost correct.)
Also, regarding the points mentioned earlier that venting was delayed because Prime Minister Kan went to inspect the site early on the morning of March 12 (in the first place, if you think that hydrogen backflowed and the building exploded when you thought you could vent afterward...), and that seawater injection was interrupted by Prime Minister Kan's order, it has already been confirmed that they were "hoaxes" including political maneuvers, since it was not interrupted in the first place. For some reason, regarding the "defamation" by the e-mail magazine of the current Prime Minister Abe, the source of the "seawater injection interruption" hoax, although it was "not recognized" in court, the fact that the seawater injection interruption was a hoax was also confirmed in the factual findings in court. https://www.tbsradio.jp/124300 https://megalodon.jp/2013-0717-2331-11/www.s-abe.or.jp/topics/mailmagazine/2291 (Mail magazine archive)
And the abnormal point of this ruling is that regarding the fact that he continued to spread hoax information for a long time even "after the factual relationship became clear," defamation was not established. Saying it's OK because it's only presented to some people is a stupid logic that, if it were the media, as long as they don't continue to present misreports or fabrications in real time, it's the same condition because it's not seen by people, and if things go badly, even "leaving misreports without correction" might be allowed for the media. It's just a quibble to avoid establishing defamation.
On the other hand, it also seems to be a fact that Prime Minister Kan becoming emotional, saying "consider the possibility of re-criticality," made TEPCO Fellow Takekuro, who was at the Official Residence, arbitrarily read too much into it and instruct Director Yoshida to "stop the injection." Well, in the first place, at that point, Prime Minister Kan didn't even know that seawater injection had already started, so an "interruption instruction" is impossible.
Besides that, stories like "the Official Residence refused the provision of coolant from the U.S." (initially reported by the Yomiuri Shimbun after receiving reports from the U.S. side) http://www.asyura2.com/11/senkyo110/msg/341.html were also seen, but since the coolant of a light water reactor = water, there is no meaning in it being provided by the U.S. in an emergency (boric acid has a role in suppressing the nuclear fission reaction, but it has no direct cooling effect, so it is completely unrelated to coolant), and at the time, although seawater was injected because fresh water was insufficient, since preparations for sufficient fresh water could not be made even outside the site (the situation where fresh water was provided by the U.S. military was after March 25 when the reactors could be controlled to some extent), it is thought that there was some kind of confusion including the U.S. government at the time of the confusion immediately after the earthquake, and sloppy reporting based on unconfirmed information or intentional reporting was also seen. Regarding this, Yuri has still not made a correction report.
Furthermore, there was information that the Official Residence (that is, Prime Minister Kan, etc.) made them conceal the meltdown (because the scene where a memo from the Official Residence saying "don't use meltdown" was conveyed during a TEPCO press conference was caught on camera), but in the subsequent verification led by Niigata Prefecture (in connection with the resumption of operation of the Kariwa Power Plant) with TEPCO, it is also known that the Official Residence was not involved in that instruction.
Also, regarding "core melting," which has the same meaning as meltdown, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano used it even in press conferences, and while it might be established as the purpose of "thinning the impact of the word meltdown," it would be unreasonable to say that the factual relationship was concealed. https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASKDV77DDKDVUOHB011.html
At the same time, I will also verify the fact that there was a fuss about "the Official Residence" concealing SPEEDI (System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information). Because of this, it was criticized that people who evacuated to Namie Town were exposed to high concentrations of radioactive substances.
First, to be strict, SPEEDI information did initially go to Fukushima Prefecture. However, the Fukushima Prefecture side discarded the data sent by e-mail. https://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/sec/16025c/genan13.html Therefore, the fact that the information was completely concealed was "almost" a hoax.
However, actually, it has been revealed that the three political appointees (Minister, Vice-Minister, Parliamentary Secretary) of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology concealed subsequent data (http://portirland.blogspot.com/2013/07/suzuki-kan-genpatu-jiko-speedi-inpei-riyu.html), and in that sense, it can be said that it was correct and not a hoax.
On the other hand, since the Official Residence is the "Prime Minister's Official Residence," if it was an independent judgment of the three MEXT appointees, it is unrelated to the Official Residence (it is correct if it is the framework of the "administration"), so attacking Prime Minister Kan in this context is another problem (he naturally has supervisory responsibility as the head of the administration), and it should be seen that the fact that these were confused made the story strange. The essence of the problem should be seen as lying in the fact that the core, including Prime Minister Kan who was at the Official Residence at the time, did not know that SPEEDI had been used in prior nuclear accident drills and did not think of using SPEEDI.
In the first place, when the LDP, which was the side attacking for concealing SPEEDI information, came to power, they started saying nonsensical things like the (national Nuclear Regulation Authority) would not use SPEEDI information for evacuation judgments, and it can only be said that it was a criticism for political purposes. https://mainichi.jp/articles/20160321/ddm/005/070/007000c
Conversely, regarding the "TEPCO withdrawal prevention problem" where Prime Minister Kan stopped TEPCO's withdrawal, the fact that it was Prime Minister Kan's achievement is completely denied.
First, until Prime Minister Kan met with TEPCO President Shimizu at the Official Residence, it seems the Official Residence side had a recognition that there "was" an intention to withdraw, but since Mr. Ito Tetsuro, who was the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management and a former police bureaucrat unrelated to the Democratic Party, testifies that there "was," it is at least a fact that such a recognition or misunderstanding had arisen until then.
However, at the point Prime Minister Kan met with President Shimizu, when Prime Minister Kan said "Withdrawal is not allowed!", President Shimizu said "We have no intention of withdrawing," and Prime Minister Kan also testifies to that. In other words, it is certain that TEPCO had no intention of withdrawing at this point. The problem is that it should be seen as a problem of interpretation regarding "how many people to leave behind," which is reasonable nowadays. Naturally, the "site" had no intention of withdrawing, and real-time telephone confirmation was obtained with the Official Residence side on that point; this is nothing more than a problem between the TEPCO "head office" side and the Official Residence.
http://iiko.hatenablog.com/entry/20120725/1343193826
However, although this source says "the Official Residence side is lying," the fact that Prime Minister Kan himself testifies that "the withdrawal problem was gone" at the point he met with TEPCO, and the fact that the Official Residence side had recognized the withdrawal problem from TEPCO's talk until then, are not contradictory, so regardless of whether there was a "misunderstanding of communication" between the Official Residence and TEPCO, whether that directly becomes an "intentional lie" is just the individual interpretation of the source. Well, regarding this "theory of interpretation," there are various things in the world including myself, so if you say it's a "way of looking at things" in a flat sense, that's the end of it.
Note that speaking of withdrawal, there is the so-called Yoshida Testimony fabrication problem where the Asahi Shimbun, based on the Yoshida Testimony, claimed that "workers fled from Fuku-ichi." Regarding this, it will be necessary to organize the factual relationships.
1) When Director Yoshida ordered "evacuation within the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant site because the dose became high," about 650 out of 700 site workers "misunderstood the instruction and moved to the Fukushima Daini nuclear plant to 'evacuate'."
2) The Asahi Shimbun reported this as "ignoring instructions and fleeing without permission."
3) Director Yoshida thought this misunderstanding of communication was "unavoidable."
https://diamond.jp/articles/-/59026?page=3
In this relationship, it is a case where judgment is divided by whether you see it as reporting that forcibly criticizes the site's morale (accurately, morality) or whether you emphasize the fact that many workers left the site in a critical situation, but both are stories that hold true, and there should be no need to take one side exclusively. The fact that Asahi distorted the facts to criticize TEPCO and the fact that the site was not controlled due to confusion and could have invited further crisis both hold true, and it is useless to lean to one side or offset them. Well, the source has a slightly different opinion from mine. Also, just to be sure, this withdrawal problem and the withdrawal problem that existed between the Official Residence and TEPCO are completely different things.
Well, in this way, the initial nuclear accident reporting has a history of being twisted by various intentions between the nuclear village and the anti-nuclear faction. Moreover, whether it's Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri, or Sankei, most nuclear accident reporting remains left without being properly verified even after the confusion settled. The only one that was made a scapegoat was Asahi's Yoshida Testimony fabrication problem, but besides this, it was full of terrible reporting to the point where it could be said that all kinds of reporting were sloppy.
However, in terms of weight, although there was a primary responsibility for settling the situation as an administration, it could be said that the rate at which the Official Residence and Prime Minister Kan were unfairly attacked was high. TEPCO was also attacked in various ways, but when verified, well, there are many things for which they actually had responsibility, and there is also the defense of the nuclear village that shifts responsibility to the Official Residence; while there are pitiful aspects, I think there are more parts that are unavoidable.
Naturally, regarding the "Ira-Kan" (T/N: Irritable Kan) behavior of Prime Minister Kan, who had an aspect of running wild and adding to the confusion out of distrust toward the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the TEPCO side who could not properly deal with it after the accident, he also cannot escape great responsibility. However, there was also a situation where no proper information entered the Official Residence for a while, and the things the site did were a series of failures, and the nuclear experts (including METI bureaucrats) were not reliable at all, and from the verification, it is clearly impossible to make that the cause of the meltdown or the nuclear accident. I will make this clear at least.
In the first place, for the operation of a nuclear plant that normally requires more than 1,000 people, responding with fewer people than that at a time of emergency when four nuclear reactors are in crisis is nothing but a tragedy rather than a beautiful story. Ending "Fukushima 50" as a moving story is fine if it's a "novel," but if you look at it as non-fiction, it's just a horror.
Apparently, a movie dealing with the Fuku-ichi nuclear accident (based on the work of Mr. Kadota Ryusho, starring Watanabe Ken and Sato Koichi) will be made in 2020, but if it is a work based on the Director Yoshida hero theory like the original, it will clearly be a work with problems. Even if there can be an evaluation that the people at the site were tossed about by the sudden accident and worked hard, there are no heroes in the series of nuclear accidents. After all, "nothing was resolved." And above all, there is the biggest problem that Director Yoshida was one of those who underestimated the tsunami. https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%A6%8F%E5%B3%B6%E7%AC%AC%E4%B8%80%E5%8E%9F%E5%AD%90%E5%8A%9B%E7%99%BA%E9%9B%BB%E6%89%80%E4%BA%8B%E6%95%85 https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%A6%8F%E5%B3%B6%E7%AC%AC%E4%B8%80%E5%8E%9F%E5%AD%90%E5%8A%9B%E7%99%BA%E9%9B%BB%E6%89%80%E4%BA%8B%E6%95%85%E3%81%AE%E7%B5%8C%E7%B7%AF (Note March 25 regarding the U.S. military's water provision)
Even so, following the Fuku-ichi accident, it can be seen that all kinds of vicious cycles occurred: being trapped in the nuclear safety myth and valuing economic efficiency, both the state and TEPCO not taking proper accident measures in advance, the overwhelming lack of response capability at the site, and the lack of measures and excessive intervention by the TEPCO head office, the Official Residence, and METI (including the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency) who became impatient because the site could no longer respond.
And as I look at the series of events, the irresponsibility of the nuclear village of the electric power companies and METI is terrible. Naturally, not to mention the irresponsibility toward nuclear administration of successive cabinets including the Kan administration, Prime Minister Abe, who spread the "seawater injection interruption" hoax, also cannot escape responsibility for ignoring the lack of tsunami measures when questioned by a Communist Party member under his first administration. (Regarding this, the same question was asked under the Hatoyama administration, and then-METI Minister Naoshima should naturally be criticized for giving a similar answer.) http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_shitsumon.nsf/html/shitsumon/a165256.htm
Furthermore, a very regrettable point is that almost no minutes were created at the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake, centered on the nuclear accident response. Two reasons can be considered for this: the purpose of "avoiding responsibility problems" and the fact that they were in a "state of panic due to the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident," but even so, the fact that subsequent verification cannot be done properly is the height of regret. The Kan administration was greatly criticized on this point, but it is known that it has actually been like this for many years even during other major disasters. In the first place, it's a country where bureaucrats burned all public documents right before the defeat in the war, so it's a bad old tradition. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS2700A_X20C12A1MM0000/ http://www.asahi.com/special/10005/TKY201201310641.html https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/matome/sengo70/20150810-OYT8T50122.html (Burning of public documents)
Author's Note: To be described later 4
The seemingly contradictory event where the currency value rises due to the occurrence of a great disaster had already been "experienced" once by the Japanese economy with the rapid yen appreciation after the Hanshin Earthquake (from a level around 100 yen to a level temporarily breaking 80 yen). As for the reason for this, it is described in http://mituwasou.com/fxblog_beginner/free/earthquake.html and https://zuuonline.com/archives/130625 (this one sees a large influence from the resolution of yen carry trades due to the disaster), but unfortunately, it is unknown to what extent it actually influenced. However, if they utilized the "experience" in the recent Hanshin Earthquake, there were not a few (institutional) investors and traders whose intuition worked that the yen would appreciate rapidly.